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SUGGESTIONS TO MANAGEMENT: ARBITRATION
v. THE LABOR BOARD
EDWARD R. LEV*
STEVEN J. FISHMAN **
Messrs. Lev and Fishman compare the dispute-settling
efficacy of private arbitration and Labor Board intervention,
and argue vigorously for the primacy of the former process.
The authors give attention to practical considerations of
equity, therapy and convenience within the labor-manage-
ment relationship, and interpret the institutional interests
of the Board itself. A review of the statutory origins and of
the doubtful consistency of the decisional growth of Board
jurisdiction in arbitrable controversies reinforces their prefer-
ence for the arbitration process.
I. THE LABOR BOARD
The King acts through his ministers, of course, but in that field
of labor relations in which the contending parties have agreed to settle
their disagreements privately, it would probably be better if the King
told his ministers not to meddle. The National Labor Relations Board,
whose primary function is to limit the industrial inequities and strife
which prompted the Wagner Act,' disserves its purpose when it inter-
feres with the arbitral process. The Board actually creates strife by
prolonging disputes which the parties could happily dissipate through
arbitration in one-tenth the time at one-twentieth the cost. It is prob-
* LL.B., University of Cincinnati, 1955; LL.M., Northwestern University, 1956;
Member, Chicago Bar Association; Partner, Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown &
Platt, Chicago, Illinois.
** B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1962; JD., Northwestern University, 1965; Mem-
ber, Illinois State Bar Association, Federal Bar Association, American Bar Association;
Former Attorney, National Labor Relations Board; Associate, Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess,
Tierney, Brown & Platt, Chicago, Illinois.
1 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-88 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
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ably unfair to suggest that the Board is more concerned with its seign-
iory than with a prompt end to industrial bickering, but the Board's
intervention in matters readily soluble by quick arbitration has pre-
cisely that effect. The Board promotes industrial strife when it ad-
ministers its statute to enfeeble arbitration. No amount of rhetoric
about the Board's jurisdiction remaining "unaffected by any other
means of adjustment" 2
 can obscure the fact, known to all practitioners,
that the Board, albeit under color of law, is a trespasser in this area and
actually protracts the disputes which it was designed to abbreviate.
The reader is entitled to the intelligence that the authors of this
article write from an employer bias. The sentiments expressed in the
previous paragraph could not proceed from an opposite bias. Although
all but a handful of the annual thousands of arbitrations originate
with unions, it must be comforting to a grievant or his representa-
tive to know that alternative forums for justice are available if arbi-
tration is tactically inexpedient. From the employer's viewpoint, a
comparison of the two forums to resolve the routine labor squabble
is no comparison at all. Arbitration is prompt, inexpensive and gen-
erally even-handed. The Board proceeding embodies directly opposite
qualities, including a bias against employers almost genetic in its origin,
sired in the 1930s when employers simply ignored the fundamental
needs of the working man.
Disciplinary cases are by far the largest source of company-union
friction. They are clearly arbitrable by' all labor agreements, with rare
exceptions. They are also cognizable under Sections 8(a) (1) and (3)
of the Act, which in substance prohibit any interference with, or em-
ployment discrimination by reason of, union or protected activities. 3
Not much imagination is required of a union officer to allege union
activity as the precipitating cause of the discipline and thereby to
provoke the investigative forces of the Board. It costs nothing to file
a charge with the Board. No expertise is required. Forms are provided
and an officer-of-the-day is continuously available to advise the griev-
2 Section 10(a) of the Act states that "Lillie Board is empowered, as hereinafter
provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting
commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or pre-
vention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise. . . ."
20 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964) (emphasis added).
3 Sections 8(a)(I) and (3) provide:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization . .
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1),(3) (1964).
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ant, and his more sophisticated union representative, of what docu-
ments to sign and what evidence to gather.
The burdens upon a company begin to accumulate at this point.
Board investigators, having obtained the employee's version, must
interview company representatives to determine' the merits of the
charge and whether to proceed to complaint. 4
 This is a time-consuming
chore, and while no obligation rests on a company to grant the inter-
views or cooperate with the investigators, a refusal to do so increases
the odds that a complaint will issue. Since most charges are disposed
of by the Board without further action once the investigator hears
the company's reasons for discipline, it is advisable that a company
with a strong case spend cooperative time in the initial stages to avoid
the greater expenditure of a complaint and hearing. 6
Experience in this field is instructive. The Board's Regional
Directors, who for unfair labor practice purposes are agents of the
General Counsel and who possess the authority to issue or decline
to issue a complaint, will usually refrain from resolving credibility
issues. Unions are aware of this fact and phrase their charges accord-
ingly. Charges filed when the Region is extremely busy stand a lesser
chance of maturing into complaints than charges filed when the
Director's attorneys and subordinates are looking for work. In other
words, the human element intervenes, and while no one can impugn
the Board's conduct in this regard, it is the inevitable price which
one pays for an administrative system.
Suppose that there is merit to a particular charge and a complaint
issues. From charge to complaint and from complaint to hearing, the
time lapse is, at least in the Chicago region, about 60 days. Respon-
sive pleadings are required. Witnesses must be prepared with a view
to professional cross-examination. A hearing must be had with a degree
of formality only slightly less than a full-blown trial. This requirement
means the services of an attorney, with an attendant expense which
only prosperous companies can bear. The legal expense does not stop
at the hearing. Briefs to the Trial Examiner (who conducts the hear-
ing, rules on evidence and credibility, and submits a recommended
4 Labor Board investigators are usually young attorneys starting their careers. They
have no power to decide whether a complaint issues. They draft a report with recom-
mendations, and sit in on the agenda meetings where senior personnel make the "go,"
"no-go" decision.
5 "Board" is used here collectively to include Region, Regional Director, General
Counsel and the Board itself, unless the context makes it otherwise clear.
6 Cooperation, however, should stop short of signing the affidavits invariably re-
quested by the Board investigators. A poorly phrased affidavit, if a complaint issues, is
grist for the impeachment mill, and while a willingness to submit affidavits may impress
an investigator and his superiors, experience teaches that the Board will issue a complaint
only if they foresee a reasonable chance of victory. Accordingly, .a refusal to sign affi-
davits during the investigative process does not significantly increase the chances of a
complaint.
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decision to the Board) are traditional, as are briefs to the Board, ex-
cept in the unusual case where all parties are satisfied with the Trial
Examiner's opinion and recommendations.
In other words, routine plant discipline can precipitate an expen-
sive trial resplendent with appeals. Moreover, the expense of litigation
is not the employer's only injury. In the usual case, it is some solace
to even a disappointed litigant that his opponent has suffered an
equally oppressive legal bill. However, where a union succeeds in
extracting a complaint from the Labor Board, it may stand aside and
let the Board prosecute. While the government's least concern is the
expense of trial, the respondent company bears the full brunt of legal
fees and expenses absent even the satisfaction that the real opponent
has suffered equally. Thus, the union can avail itself of a unique
economic advantage by way of the unilateral expense to the company.
Naturally, the charging parties' knowledge that the government will
act as their attorney encourages the filing of charges.
The usual period of time from charge to hearing is two months,
as noted before, but from hearing to final Board action (barring ap-
peals to court) may take years. If back pay is involved, and the em-
ployee earns at a lesser rate in the interim than his rate prior to the
discipline, the employer incurs even further expense as he must make
up the difference—in many cases a substantial amount.` The result
is a delay and expense endemic to litigation, caused no less by the
deliberations which lawyers and judges presume to count as wisdom
than by the difficulty of the effort of five men to administer an entire
nation's labor laws. In short, it is sheer nonsense to wheel up a federal
agency to administer a plant discharge.
Unilateral expense and delay are the hallmarks of Board action.
As a result, the employer becomes gun shy. Discipline is withheld out
of simple business considerations and the net result is an increase in
union power. The employer knows that the union officer can divert
the grievant from the Board. But the employer also knows that the
price of intercession would be concession, psychological or otherwise,
in another area of company-union relations.
The deliberative process of the Board offers no comfort to an
employer. The safeguards of common law evidence, the presence of a
court reporter, the assistance of trained counsel, and the protective
supervision of conservative courts, are no match for Trial Examiners
and Board members who know that employers are hostile to the con-
cept of unionism. The knowledge is based on fact. Employers would
much prefer to exercise unrestricted the economic powers which
7 In J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 356, 68 L.R.R.M. 2916 (5th
Cir. 1968), the court refused, because of the inordinate delay by the Board in issuing
a back-pay specification, to enforce more than 5 years back pay.
766
ARBITRATION v. THE LABOR BOARD
fortuity has placed in their hands. Unions, by the threat of concerted
activities, force employers to pay more to employees than the company
accountant would prefer and to accord greater weight than would
the efficiency expert to seniority, working conditions and simple em-
ployee dignity. This awareness of employer attitude is the premise
of Board action which over the years has contributed to the enormous
increase of union leverage over all but the largest of employers. The
premise is inarticulate, of course. The flaw in its formulation is that
the "hostility" towards unionism which Board members employ as a
subconscious rationalization against employers is not the hostility
which the law prohibits. Most employers, at least those who have
emerged from the stone age, acknowledge and work with unions much
as they acknowledge and work with the Internal Revenue Service.
They do not like it but they live with it. The Board should penalize
cheating but not presume its existence. The Board does not properly
distinguish between kinds of hostility, and thereby it converts its court-
rooms into arenas in which one of the gladiators has the advantage.
As a basic proposition, all other considerations aside, it is an
economic waste to employ the ponderous machinery of a federal agency
to settle union disputes which the parties thereto are perfectly capable
of handling themselves. 8 Let no one think that divesting the Board
of jurisdiction over arbitral matters leaves the employer with free
rein. The grievant is represented by a union generally far more pow-
erful than the company which employs its members. Nor is there
any suggestion that the Board's powers be diminished where em-
ployees are unrepresented. Rather, it is assumed for these purposes
that a labor agreement offers the ordinary protections enforceable by
arbitration and Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act.°
The proposition may be stated, for the reasons herein argued, that
whenever an enforceable labor agreement provides for machinery to
terminate disputes between an employer and a labor organization, the
Board should have no power to act.
II. THE ARBITRATION TRIBUNAL
The purpose of the Labor Board is to administer and vindicate
a statute enacted by Congress which has chosen to impose certain
standards of conduct, usually and otherwise referred to as justice.
But this is not the purpose of arbitration. If justice emerges from the
informality of arbitration the parties may count themselves the for-
tunate recipients of an unintended windfall. The fact is that the idea
8 See Sarnoff, Arbitration, Not NLRB Intervention, 18 Lab. L.J. 602 (1967).
9 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). Section 301 opens the federal courts to suits for violations
of contracts between employers and unions representing employees in industries affecting
commerce. This access permits enforcement of agreements to arbitrate. Textile Workeis
Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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behind arbitration is to end labor squabbles in the conference room,
and avoid their spilling into the street. Even an unjust solution to
plant grievances is nevertheless a solution and far better than none
at all. It is this insight, known to every farmer in the labor field,
which has escaped the Board and which if understood by it would
protect untold generations of flies from the onslaught of triphammers.
Once the arbitration purpose is understood, and once some of
the ground rules are known, the prompt and inexpensive nature of
arbitration becomes explicable. The system is not ideal and there are
pitfalls for the unwary employer, but for the routine plant dispute
no better method exists. The distinguishing hallmark is finality at
moderate expense, attributes which are, in context, of greater im-
portance than correctness of result.
From grievance to final judgment, a discipline case in arbitration
is ended in about two to three months, much of which time is con-
sumed by the parties' pre-arbitration grievance procedure. Hearings
of more than one day are uncommon. Pleadings are unheard of. Evi-
dentiary rules are generally ignored and all but the most egregious
testimony is admitted. Lawyers, briefs and transcripts of proceedings
appear in less than half of all arbitrations. The company's personnel
director and the union's international representative are the usual pro-
tagonists, in a confrontation between friendly enemies. The hearings
are adversary but in a sense different from formal litigation. The rep-
resentatives know each other intimately and are reluctant to inflict
wounds which will fester and infect their relationship for the future.
Perjury abounds, but no more than in formal proceedings and perhaps
less because the spectators and principals are friends who know.
The average cost to each party of an uncomplicated arbitration
is about 500 dollars. The cost is great enough to deter a frivolous
resort to the forum but is hardly onerous. Compared with the cost of
a Board proceeding, the amount is paltry. Where lawyers and court
reporters are used, and briefs are composed, the expense escalates
dramatically, but even then the cost to each side is usually under an
additional 1000 to 1500 dollars. There are no appeals save in those
cases where the principle at stake is crucial or where feelings run deep.
The courts' aversion to any intrusion upon an arbitrator's judgment
explains the paucity of appeals,' an aversion grounded in the good
sense which recognizes that prompt finality is a goal of greater sub-
stance in this area than any other. Indeed, unless an award is patently
fraudulent, or the vital interests of either party are at stake, arbitra-
tion appeals are clearly unwarranted.
10 See the arbitration trilogy: .United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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The emphasis given here to convenience of arbitration should
not suggest that a flip of a coin would be an acceptable substitute. Of
course, enough justice must emerge else companies and unions would
have foregone the remedy long ago. The fact is that most arbitration
awards, like most jury cases, are adequate. The reputation of an
arbitrator, if his livelihood depends largely on that activity, is greater
in respective importance than that of the robed jurist whose tenure
is assured until the next election or appointment. The measurable
advantage is that the arbitrator cannot offend either litigant by a
patently improper decision because his future employment is placed
in immediate jeopardy. The arbitrator has an economic interest in a
just award, and on the roster of comparative priorities men usually
place that interest first. The losing litigant confronted with an equitable
award instinctively knows that his disappointment proceeds from a
deflated pride. He will select the same arbitrator again either out of
respect for his wisdom or because of a cynical prospect that the arbi-
trator owes him one. In either event, and because the winner thinks
him favorably biased, the arbitrator is reappointed. The arbitrator
who ignores the merits, or who lacks the competence to define the
real issues, will see his business dwindle as the losing party spreads
the word. Hence, arbitration is a self-regulating system which has
evolved, in this country at least, as a more than satisfactory means to
calm labor turbulence.
Unexpected dividends arise from arbitration which the Labor
Board cannot pay. Unless the labor agreement is unduly restrictive,
an arbitrator can tailor his award to suit what he detects are the in-
tentions of the parties. Discipline may be reduced; reinstatement may
be ordered without back pay; a "warning" can be given, tantamount
to probation, which is usually respected by the relieved grievant; both
parties may be praised in writing for their good faith; and wholesome
admonitions can be incorporated into an award and can thereafter be
relied upon by the parties to circumscribe exaggerated positions. Even
the loser is given something by the talented arbitrator and prideful
feathers can be smoothed. The Labor Board, hobbled by a statute,
and politically concerned with sensitive superiors, has neither the
expertise nor the understanding to play Solomon in what is, after all,
a contest between humans.
Another advantage of arbitration, which the Labor Board cannot
meet, is that the forum itself is an extension of the collective bargain-
ing process. The parties meet across the table and air grievances
unhindered by the doctrine of relevance. The immediate issue which
the arbitrator is called upon to decide may be merely the tip of the
iceberg. But its exposure permits both sides to consider solutions to
difficulties more sensitive than the reason for the hearing. The arbi-
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trator knows as much. Testimony which would be laughingly irrelevant
in a court of law is admitted with all the solemnity of critical docti-
ments. The parties have unburdened themselves, insults are avenged,
and tensions reduced by the psychological benefits which flow from
cathartic disgorgement.
But the Labor Board is bound by a law. Settlements can be
effected, but the rigors of a statute and the fear of critical superiors
in Washington make the settlement process difficult. Apart from the
higher cost of settlements which employers must pay to avoid the
stranglehold of extended litigation, the humiliation of a mea culpa
notice is usually exacted by the Board. The net effect is an angry
employer, angry with the union for precipitating the charge, angry
with a grievant who may have received an unwarranted windfall, and
angry with the Board who seemed to have acted as a union partisan.
This result hardly improves labor relations, unless the Board defines
improvement to include a lessening of employer status.
Concededly, some discoloration exists in the arbitration picture.
The number of competent arbitrators is gradually declining. Em-
ployers and unions are reluctant to use younger, unknown aspirants
who are in turn unable to acquire the experience and reputation which
parties demand. The costs are gradually increasing as inflationary
pressures grow, and there appears to be a growing tendency, perhaps
caused by an influx of academics as arbitrators, to formalize the
process in order to make it appear more difficult and mysterious. But
the genius of the system lies in its ability to heal itself for no reason
other than that it is to the economic benefit of the principals that it
do so. The alternative, recourse to the Labor Board and the courts,
is appalling.
The gradual commitment of full-time arbitrators to the industrial
field will assure a continuing effort to ameliorate injustices as they
occur. There is no room for doubt, after a balancing of all considera-
tions, that the impartial arbitration of labor disputes dealing with
the construction of collective bargaining agreements is far superior
to Labor Board involvement. Only a tenacious interest in the vested
benefits of a bureaucratic agency can explain the tolerance granted
by Congress to its maintenance. Equally surprising is the attitude of
the judiciary which is usually ingenious enough, when it so desires, to
manipulate statutory language to uncover an intent corresponding to
social needs.
III. SECTION 10(a)
But the courts have a mountain to climb. Section 10(a) of the
Act' provides that the power of the Board to prevent any person from
11 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964).
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engaging in an unfair labor practice "shall not be affected by any
other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise. . . ." At first glance it is
hard to see how a court can overcome the clear language of the statute.
The casual reader is mesmerized by the term "agreement," for labor
arbitration proceeds from, and cannot exist in the absence of, agree-
ment between a company and a union. The fact is, however, that
Congress in 1935 did not necessarily intend "agreement" to mean
"labor agreement." Indeed, a valid argument can be made that Con-
gress had in mind a completely different kind of agreement.
This fact finds support in the congressional debates attendant to
the passage of the Wagner Act. Time has mercifully shadowed the
events of the Depression years, but the National Industrial Recovery
Act was much alive in those days?' The NIRA, which was ultimately
consigned for constitutional reasons to a legislative graveyard, author-
ized the creation of industrial codes among government, industry and
labor. The intent, whatever the euphemism, was to fix wages and
prices. Agreements were to be reached in tripartite fashion which
would govern the wage, price and distribution practices of the partic-
ular industry. As part of the agreements, or codes, machinery would
be established to settle the inevitable labor disputes. The principle of
the NIRA was the self-regulation of industry and labor. It was con-
templated that labor organizations would represent their membership
in matters affecting them.
The problem confronting Congress in the Wagner Act was whether
to grant paramount authority to the Labor Board in those areas over-
lapping with the respective industrial codes drawn up under the NIRA.
It was advocated, on the one hand, that the jurisdiction of the NLRB
should be carefully insulated from encroachment by any agencies
established by codes or agreements pursuant to the NIRA. It was
argued that the motive behind the first sentence of section 10(a) was
to dispel any doubts as to the intent of Congress regarding the supe-
riority of the Board over the NIRA agreements.' 3 "[These special
12 Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 90, 43 Stat. 195. The Act was invalidated in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Section 4(a) of the
NIRA authorized the President "to enter into agreements with, and to approve volun-
tary agreements between and among, persons engaged in a trade or industry, labor
organizations, and trade or industrial organizations, associations, or groups, relating to
any trade or industry, if in his judgment such agreements will aid in effectuating the
policy of this chapter . 
13 The motive for writing in this section can best be understood by refer-
ence to the President's letter to Mr. Biddle in regard to the case of Jennings
v. The San Francisco Call Bulletin. In that case it will be remembered that
although the National Labor Relations Board thought it could decide a case in
the newspaper industry, the President suggested that the Board should not take
jurisdiction over any such case, since there had been provided by code a labor
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industrial relations boards in the several industries would be mediation
boards and not law-enforcement boards. It is a further carrying forward
of the idea of dividing these two functions!'
The historical context illuminating the meaning of the term "agree-
ment" is put into even sharper focus by reference to the arguments
against granting the Board sovereignty over the NIRA agreements. One
opponent declared that section 10 was an attempt "to supersede all
of the machinery heretofore established under the [NIRA] . . . for
the settlement of labor disputes. It is at variance with the fundamental
principle of the NIRA—Government-supervised self-regulation of in-
dustry and labor."15
Eventually, history informs us, the decision was in favor of the
Labor Board. What emerges from this debate, however, is that the
word "agreement" in Section 10(a) of the Act need not, and probably
did not, mean "labor agreement."' Congress seemed to have had in
mind those agreements among industry, labor and the government
which were to govern not only labor matters but prices, production and
distribution. As between the industry boards, which arose out of tri-
lateral agreements, and the Labor Board, Congress allocated to the
Labor Board paramount authority in the overlapping areas. There is
nothing in the legislative history of the Act which suggests that Con-
gress included within the meaning of "agreement," as used in section
10(a), those private agreements reached by a particular employer and
the union which represented its employees. There is nothing in the
legislative history of section 10(a) to suggest that the Labor Board
was to possess the power to disregard the award of an arbitrator
appointed under a labor agreement and to substitute its own judgment
in purported pursuit of statutory purposes.
It cannot be gainsaid that Congress, at least after 1947, favored
arbitration as a dispute-settling procedure. Section 203 (d) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) Act" is explicit. It
provides:
(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or inter-
pretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement.
The [Mediation and Conciliation] Service is directed to
make its concilation and mediation services available in the
board supposedly competent to hear labor disputes in the newspaper industry.
2 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act 1323 (1949).
14 Id. at 2097.
15 Id. at 1750.
16 For a complete resume of the legislative history of § 10(a), see Legislative His-
tory of the National Labor Relations Act (2 vols.) (1949).
17 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1964).
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settlement of such grievance disputes only as a last resort
and in exceptional cases.
Section 201(c) of the Act is to the same effect." Citation of these
provisions may prove too much, of course, because if Congress were
determined to displace Board action by arbitration it could have done
so in 1947 by amending section 10(a) itself. Congress was aware that
the Board had assumed jurisdiction of matters otherwise arbitrable
before the Taft-Hartley Act was passed." Arguments of congressional
intent in this regard are make-weight, however. Perhaps Congress in-
tended the Board to withdraw gracefully from deciding arbitrable mat-
ters and enacted section 203 (d) as a courteous face-saving push in
that direction.
In any event, the fact remains that the Board, as well as the
courts, have repeatedly cited section 10(a) whenever a respondent
has challenged its power to act in a matter of arbitral cognizance.
Surprisingly, in the many years since section 10(a) was adopted,
neither the Board nor the courts have stopped to inquire into the
legislative history of the term "agreement." 2° This oversight, calculated
or otherwise, has permitted a body of law to grow to a size now in-
surmountable. It has become an axiom of labor law, a proposition
assumed without proof, that the Board by virtue of section 10(a) can
assume jurisdiction of an arbitrable dispute irrespective of the parties'
agreement and irrespective, further, of the award itself. It is doubt-
ful, despite the obvious advantage to industrial relations, whether
even the courts can be persuaded to peel away the encrusted decisions
and re-examine basic congressional purpose.
IV. THE BOARD PRECEDENTS
The first challenge to the Board's power to decide matters within
the competence of arbitrators occurred in 1939. The reaction of the
Board was bluntly antagonistic. In J. Klotz & Co.,2' an employer
had been charged with moving its plant and discharging and locking
out union members at the new location. Eventually, both the employer
and the union agreed to arbitrate and to be bound by the final award.
The neutral directed that the discharged and locked out employees
be reinstated. A Trial Examiner recommended dismissal of the coal-
18 29 U.S.C. § 171(c) (1964).
10 See J. Klotz & Co., 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 4 L.R,R.M. 344 (1939).
20 See NLRB v. Hershey Chocolate Corp., 297 F.2d 286, 49 L.R.R.M. 2173 (3d Cir.
1961); NLRB v. Bell Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 32 L.R.R.M. 2550 (2d Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Local 291, UAW, 194 F.2d 698, 29 L.R.R.M. 2433 (7th Cir. 1952); NLRB
v. Walt Disney Prods., 146 F.2d 44, 15 L.R.R.M. 691 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 877 (1945); NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 120 F.2d 262, 7 L.R.R.M. 379
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 ('1941) ; Annot., 137 A.L.R. 867 (1942).
21 13 N.L.R.B. 746, 4 L.R.R.M. 344 (1939).
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plaint on the ground that the arbitrator's award had satisfied the Act's
remedial demands. The Board ruled otherwise, footnoting and relying
on Section 10(a) of the Act.
This recommendation is hereby rejected. The . . . award did
not purport to settle any disputes under the Act, nor was the
question of violation of the Act as such before the parties or
the Impartial Chairman. Moreover, a settlement of disputes
between the parties involved cannot oust the Board of juris-
diction in regard to those disputes where they involve unfair
labor practices. In prior cases, the Board had stated that
The Board itself, representing the United States,
is a party in interest in proceedings relating to unfair
labor practices under the Act. No private party can
sanction an employer's interference, restraint or coercion
in the exercise of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act ...22
In other words, the Board did not intend to abdicate its work to
anyone else. This is a Schopenhauerian demonstration of the will
to power syndrome common to all administrators. It is the territorial
imperative revealing itself far from the primate jungle, and it was
entirely predictable.
At least one court experienced trouble with this proposition. In
NLRB v. Newark Morning Ledger Co.,23
 the Third Circuit refused
to enforce a reinstatement order because the company and union had
signed a labor agreement covering disciplinary matters. The court
stressed that the function of the Board under the Act was to "pave
the way" for collective bargaining on an equal basis by the protection
of employees from employer interference, intimidation and coercion,
so that voluntary agreements as to wages, hours and other conditions
of employment could be reached. Thus, the ultimate goal of diminution
of industrial strife could be attained. The Third Circuit also em-
phasized the exclusively private nature of the collective bargaining
agreement.
[T]his [violation of the terms of a bargaining contract] is
a breach of a private right which may be redressed in the
manner stipulated in the agreement or by recourse to the
courts. The National Labor Relations Act contemplates no
more than the protection of the public rights which it creates
and defines. . .. [I]t is no part of [the Board's] duty to
police the relations between an employer and his employee
22 Id. at 758-59, 4 L.R.R.M. at 347 (footnotes omitted).
23 120 F,2d 262, 7 L.R.R.M. 379 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 693 (1941).
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under a collective bargaining agreement. To construe the
Act otherwise would be to impose upon the Board the Her-
culean task of supervising the day to day relations of em-
ployers and employees in that vast and ever growing seg-
ment of commerce and industry in which successful collective
bargaining has well nigh eliminated industrial strife. 24 (Em-
phasis added.)
However, on rehearing, the court reversed itself, citing Section
10(a) of the Act,23
 as conferring upon the Board a discretion to exer-
cise its "very broad" jurisdiction. Although "the mere fact that a
private right ... has been infringed . . . is it not of itself sufficient to
bring the Board's powers into play," 26 the court declined to interfere
with the Board's power to determine whether the public interest re-
quired it to act."
In Rieke Metal Prods. Corp.," the employer had discharged sev-
eral employees during an organizing campaign but later entered into
an arbitration agreement settling the strike. The discharges were sub-
mitted to the arbitrator. The award found all but one of the discharges
illegal and directed reinstatement with back pay. The company com-
plied with the award and moved to dismiss the section 8(a) (3) allega-
tions. The Board, limiting its interest to a cease and desist order,
found the contention without merit. 2° "This proceeding is concerned
not with private rights, but rather with enforcement of a public policy
over which the Board, pursuant to Section 10(a) of the Act, has ex-
clusive jurisdiction, 'not affected by any other means of adjustment.' "'"
The first case in which the Board was willing to pay some respect
to the value of arbitration machinery, Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 3'
arose in a defense plant which had made extensive operational changes,
including third shift and classification changes, without prior con-
sultation with the union representing its employees. The company also
terminated a union committeeman. Unfair labor practice charges were
dismissed on the theory that the union could have resorted, but did not,
to grievance and arbitration procedures.
The Board noted that the union was, in effect, asking it to inter-
vene in a situation where contractual arbitration machinery was avail-
24 Id. at 265-66, 7 L.R.R.M. at 381-82.
25 Id. at 266, 8 L.R.R.M. 571.
26 Id. at 268, 8 L.R.R.M. at 574.
21 Id., 8 L.R.R.M. at 574.
28
 40 N.L.R.B. 867, 10 L.R.R.M. 82 (1942).
29 See also North American Aviation, Inc., 44 N.L.R.B. 604, 11 L.R.R.M. 63 (1942),
enforcement denied, 136 F.2d 898, 12 L.R.R,M, 806 (9th Cir. 1943).
39 40 N.L.R.B. at 874.
31 47 N.L.R.B. 694, 12 L.R.R.M. 44 (1943), modified on other grounds, 141 F,2d
785, 14 L.R.R.M. 553 (9th Cir. 1944),
775
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
able which the union had not even attempted to utilize. The Board also
pointed out that the execution of a collective bargaining contract does
not terminate the process of bargaining which includes the interpreta-
tion and administration of the contract as well as the settlement of
disputes arising under it. It was said that intervention by the Board
would impair collective bargaining by encouraging the parties to aban-
don the settlement procedures upon which they had agreed. 32
Thus the Board held that "[w]e . . . do not deem it wise to exer-
cise our jurisdiction in such a case, where the parties have not ex-
hausted their rights and remedies under the contract as to which the
dispute has arisen."'
The employer in Consolidated was not accused of anti-union dis-
crimination in its failure to bargain. Although the principle of Board
deference to arbitration would presumably cover such a case, no arbi-
trator, unless burdened by extraordinary language in the agreement,
will uphold a discharge based on union activity. However, in S. K.
Wellman Co.," where an employee was discharged for seeking to orga-
nize a union as a rival to the incumbent, the Board declined to apply
Consolidated because the interest of the employee's union was adverse
to the employee. The Board's ruling was clearly proper, as it would
be too much to expect from an incumbent union that it zealously repre-
sent an employee dedicated to the incumbent's destruction. Wellman
is comparable to the cases in which no arbitration machinery was
available.' 5 Similarly, in Aluminum Co. of America 6
 the Board re-
fused to respect an award which upheld the discharge of an employee
under the union security provisions of the labor agreement. The em-
ployee was deprived of effective representation by a union whose con-
flict of interest was patent. 37
Consolidated was followed by the Board in Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co.,38 where the employer was charged with refusal to bargain after
32 Id. at 706, 12 L.R.R.M. at 45.
33 Id.
34 53 N.L.R.B. 214, 13 L.R.R.M. 97 (1943).
35 In the absence of grievance machinery, Consolidated was held not to govern.
United States Plywood Corp., 49 N.L.R.B. 1106, 12 L.R.R.M. 187 (1943). See also Marl-
boro Cotton Mills, 53 N.L.R.B. 965, 13 L.R.R.M. 142 (1943) (employer did not cooper-
ate in union's effort to arbitrate discharge of union president and thus was not allowed
to argue the availability of arbitration machinery).
86 68 N.L.R.B. 750, 18 L.R.R.M. 1169, enforcement denied, 159 F.2d 523, 19
L.R.R.M. 2164 (7th Cir. 1946).
37 Accord, Local 291, UAW, 92 N.L.R.B. 968, 27 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1950), enforced,
194 F.2d 698, 29 L.R.R.M. 2433 (7th Cir. 1952); Hamilton-Scheu & Walsh Shoe Co.,
80 N.L.R.B. 1496, 23 L.R.R.M. 1263 (1948). But see Paramount Pictures, Inc., 79
N.L.R.B. 557, 22 L.R.R.M. 1428 (1948), where the Board dismissed maintenance-of-
membership discharges by deferring to an arbitration award in favor of the employer.
38
 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 18 L.R.R.M. 1370 (1946), enforcement denied on other grounds,
161 F.2d 949, 20 L.R.R.M. 2204 (6th Cir. 1947).
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unilateral publication of plant rules. Both sides submitted the contro-
versy to a neutral who ultimately ruled that the employer had acted
properly. Pending the neutral's decision the union invoked the pro-
cesses of the Board. The Board stated:
It is evident that the Union had concurrently utilized two
forums for the purpose of litigating the matter here in dispute.
... [I] t would not comport with the sound exercise of our
administrative discretion to permit the Union to seek redress
under the Act after having initiated arbitration proceedings
which, at the Union's request, resulted in a determination
upon the merits. In the interest of ending litigation and other-
wise effectuating the policies of the Act, we shall dismiss that
portion of the complaint relating to the respondent's refusal
to bargain as to the Employees' Manual."•
As in Consolidated the Board was careful to admonish observers that
its deference to arbitration in the case before it did not mean to "imply
that the determination of an arbitrator is binding upon the Board.'
Section 10 (a) was again invoked.'
The Board did not follow Consolidated, however, in General
Motors Corp.,42 and John W. Bolton & Sons, inc." In General Motors
the employer unilaterally promulgated a group insurance program and
in Bolton the employer installed, without discussion, a wage incentive
plan. In both cases arbitration was available and in both cases the
Board rejected the employers' arguments that the unions should be
required to exhaust their preliminary remedies before resorting to
the Board."
Yet the progeny of Consolidated includes Crown Zellerbach
Corp.,45 another refusal to bargain case, in which the union could have,
but did not, invoke arbitration. The reasons given by the Board for
deferring to arbitration are persuasive.
In view of this background of a peaceful and what ap-
pears to be a wholly salutary employer-employee relationship,
we are reluctant to issue a remedial collective bargaining
39 Id. at 501, 18 L.R.R.M. at 1371 (footnotes omitted).
49 Id. at 501 n.2, 18 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
41 See also Todd Shipyards Corp., 98 N.L.R.B. 814, 29 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1952)
(grievance filed but not processed to arbitration).
42 81 N.L.R.B. 779, 23 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1949), enforced, 179 F.2d 221, 25 L.R.R.M.
2281 (2d Cir. 1950).
43 91 N.L.R.B. 989, 26 L.R.R.M. 1598 (1950).
44 See also Standard Oil Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 227, 27 L.R.R.M. 1073 (1950), modified
on other grounds, 196 F.2d 892, 30 L.R.R.M. 2276 (6th Cir. '1952) (unilateral amendment
of group life insurance; defense that union failed to exhaust grievance and arbitration
machinery rejected).
49 95 N.L.R.B. 753, 28 L.R.R.M. 1357 (1951).
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order as a result of the Respondent's isolated unilateral ac-
tion. Particularly is this so since the parties have failed to
utilize the contractual procedures established for bargaining
concerning the interpretation and administration of their
contract, and where there is apparently no serious obstacle
to an amicable settlement of the issue through bargaining
within the framework provided in that contract. Indeed, the
Board has frequently stated that the stability of labor rela-
tions which the statute seeks to accomplish through the en-
couragement of the collective bargaining process ultimately
depends upon the channelization of the collective bargaining
relationship within the procedures of a collective bargaining
agreement. By encouraging the utilization of such procedures
in this case, we believe that statutory policy will best be
effectuated. Affirmative Board action would on the other
hand put the Board in the position of policing collective bar-
gaining agreements, a role we are unwilling to assume."
Consolidated was the first instance of Board deference to arbitra-
tion as an alternative means for resolving labor disputes. Decisions
following it used language exhibiting a real awareness by the Board
of the desirability of a prompt end to contract disputes. Perhaps the
exigencies of war production contributed to the result. In any event,
Consolidated's vogue was a short one for it became clear from later
decisions that the Board felt itself perfectly capable of handling all
labor matters which either party brought to its attention. In 1947,
however, the Board membership was increased from three to five, and
the Board became solidly positioned as a respected, albeit controversial,
government agency. Thus, by the 1950s, with the confidence born of
assured security, the Board could again entertain some diminution of
its monopoly.47
It did so in Spielberg Mfg. Co.," where as part of a strike settle-
ment, the company and union agreed to arbitrate the discharge of
46 Id. at 754, 28 L.R.R.M. at 1357-58 (footnotes omitted). The Board has reserved
the right to ignore an arbitration award at odds with the statute. See Stibbs Transp.
Lines, Inc., 98 N.L.R.B. 422, 29 L.R.R.M. 1349 (1952) (discharges alleged to violate
§ 8(a) (3)) ; Monsanto Chem. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 517, 29 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1951), enforced,
205 F.2d 763, 32 L.R.R.M. 2435 (8th Cir. 1953) (unlawful application of maintenance-
of-membership clause).
47 In Heckman Furniture Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 631, 31 L.R.R.M. 1.116 (1952), en-
forced, 207 F.2d 561, 32 L.R.R.M. 2759 (6th Cir. 1953), the Board found that the com-
pany had violated § 8(a) (5) by declining to furnish the union with information regard-
ing individual wage rates, wage ranges and individual job classifications. It rejected the
company's contention that the union's request for such information should have been
processed through the contract grievance procedure covering any "complaints or charges
upon matters which have not been made the subject of collective bargaining."
48 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 36 L.R.R.M. 1152 (1955).
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four employees for picket line misconduct. The arbitrator ruled for
the company and the four filed charges under section 8(a) (3). The
Board deferred to the award.
[T]he arbitration award is not . . . at odds with the statute.
This does not mean that the Board would necessarily decide
the issue of the alleged strike misconduct as the arbitration
panel did. We do not pass upon that issue. . . . [A]ll parties
had acquiesced in the arbitration proceeding. In summary,
the proceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all
parties had agreed to be bound, and the decision of the arbi-
tration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and
policies of the Act. In these circumstances we believe that
the desirable objective of encouraging the voluntary settle-
ment of labor disputes will best be served by our recognition
of the arbitrators' award. Accordingly, we find that the Re-
spondent did not violate the Act when, in accordance with the
award, it refused to reinstate the four strikers. We shall
therefore dismiss the complaint in its entirety.'"
The Spielberg guidelines required, for deference purposes, a fair
and regular arbitration proceeding, a unanimous agreement that alI
parties were to be bound, and an award not inconsistent with the poli-
cies and purposes of the Act. The Board had elevated itself to an
appeals court, presiding over arbitrations to insure technical and sub-
stantive compliance with due process under the labor laws." If the
Board adhered to the Spielberg guidelines, which cannot be faulted,
the root problems of the Board's intrusion into plant matters would
have been obviated. However, the Board, after Spielberg, assumed
jurisdiction of arbitral matters as much on an ad hoc basis as before.
Spielberg dealt with an existing arbitration award. Consistency
would require, if awards are to be respected under the conditions laid
down in Spielberg, that before resorting to the Board a party should
show some effort to exhaust the contract remedy. But this rationale
was not adopted. In Beacon Piece Dyeing & Finishing Co.,' an em-
ployer was found guilty of an unlawful refusal to bargain when it
4 Id. at 1082, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1153. Cf. Lodge 1021, IAM, 116 N.L.R.B. 645, 38
L.R.R.M. 1305 {1956), remanded, 247 F.2d 414, 40 L.R.R.M. 2497 {2d Cir. 1957).
5° See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967) (Board has jurisdiction
to remedy unfair labor practice (§ 8(a)(5)) arising out of alleged breach of agreement
containing grievance procedure but lacking arbitration clause) ; NLRB v. Acme Indus.
Co., 385 ILS. 432 (1967) (Board may compel employer to furnish to union data necessary
to implement arbitration remedy) ; Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261
{1964) (approval of doctrine of Board deferral to arbitration in dispute under § 10(k)
of the Act).
51 121 N.L.R.B. 953, 42 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1958).
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unilaterally increased its workloads and granted an unbargained-for
wage increase. The Board stated:
[T]he Board has consistently held that the collective-bargain-
ing requirement of the Act is not satisfied by a substitution
of the grievance procedure of a contract, unless the griev-
ance provisions of the contract contain a waiver of the statu-
tory right "expressed in clear and unmistakable terms." And
the Board has held further that there is no such unequivocal
waiver where, as here, the grievance provisions make no men-
tion of such a waiver. We therefore find, contrary to the
Trial Examiner, that the existence of the grievance procedure
in the contract constitutes no basis for dismissing the com-
plaint."'
Spielberg was followed in I. Oscherwitz & Sons," and deference
was paid to an arbitrator's award sustaining a discharge. But in Mon-
santo Chem. Co.,54 also a discharge case, the Board rejected an award
in which the arbitrator had declined to pass on an allegation that
union activities had played a part in the discharge and had reached
a decision on other grounds. The Board reached a similar result in
Ford Motor Co.," when it rejected an arbitration award which had
not passed on certain issues. But in General Motors Corp.," a settle-
ment reached in the grievance procedure reducing the discipline of a
committeeman was rejected by the Board because it had not pro-
ceeded to arbitration.'
In Hercules Motor Corp.," however, the Board took a significant
step forward in allowing arbitrators a broader scope in labor matters.
A union demanded time-study data to contest newly established rates.
The company denied the request and proposed arbitration. The union
sought relief at the Board, filing charges under section 8(a) (5). The
complaint was dismissed. Carefully reserving its option under section
10(a), the Board nevertheless chose to emphasize the favored role
assigned to arbitration by section 203(d). The stated policy of the
Act, the Board declared, is to encourage the practice and procedure
of collective bargaining which can best be accomplished by requiring
the parties to exhaust the remedies which they have co-authored for
the settlement of disputes. In a welcome display of common sense,
52 Id. at 961-62, 42 L.R.R.M. at 1491 (footnotes omitted). Accord, Geo. Myrmo &
Sons, 122 N.L.R.B. 256, 43 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1958) (reinstatement).
53 130 N.L.R.B. 1078, 47 L.R.R.M. 1415 (1961).
54 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 47 L.R.R.M. 1451 (1961).
55 131 N.L.R.B. 1462, 48 L.R.R.M. 1280 (1961).
54" '132 N.L.R.B. 413, 48 L.R.R.M. 1368 (1961).
57 See also Operating Eng'rs Local 18, 145 N.L.R.B. 1492, 55 L.R.R.M. 1188 (1964).
58 136 N.L.R.B. 1648, 50 L.R.R.M. 1021 (1962).
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the Board announced its reluctance to "permit [its] facilities . 	 . to
be used in avoidance of the bargaining agreement!'"
In Montgomery Ward & Co.,' the Hercules recognition of the
arbitrator's role was extended to cover the application of a labor
agreement at new plant facilities. The employer suggested arbitration.
The union chose the Board, which ruled for the employer.
[D]espite the collective bargaining agreement devised by the
parties themselves for settling such a dispute, the Union chose
instead to file the instant charges-thus asking the Board, in
effect, to intervene and resolve the dispute. In these . circum-
stances, the Board would be frustrating the Act's policy of
promoting industrial stabilization through collective bargain-
ing if we were to intervene in this dispute, instead of requir-
ing the Union in this case to give "full play" to the estab-
lished grievance procedure.'
In International Harvester Co.," the restrictions on arbitration
awards were further relaxed. It was concluded that an award is not
repugnant to the Act, one of the Spielberg criteria for acceptance, if
the award is not "palpably wrong."' Less attention was given to sec-
tion 10(a) and substantially more given to section 203(d). The union
demanded the discharge of an employee under a union security clause.
The parties agreed to arbitrate and the employer, without notice to
the employee, vigorously defended the employee's interests.
09 Id. at 1652, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1023. Hercules was held inapplicable in Acme Indus.
Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1463, 58 L.R.R.M. 1277, enforcement denied, 351 F.2d 258, 60
L.R.R.M. 2220 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 385 U.S. 432 (1967); Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 149
N.L.R.B. 950, 57 L.R.R.M. 1397 (1964), modified, 359 F.2d 983, 61 L.R.R.M. 2516 (1st
Cir. 1966) ; Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1964), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom, Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205 (1965), enforced, 362
F.2d 716, 62 L.R.R.M. 2415 (2d Cir. 1966); Sinclair Ref. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 732, 55
L.R.R.M. 1029 (1963); Timken Roller Bearing Co,, 138 N.L.R.B. 15, 50 L.R.R.M. 1508
(1962), enforced, 325 F.2d 746, 54 L.R.R.M. 2785 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
971 (1964).
" 137 N.L.R.B. 418, 50 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1962).
01 Id. at 423, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1164 (footnotes omitted). Even if the arbitration
panel has no neutral member its decisions will be honored if the parties agree to be
bound and the award is not repugnant to the Act. Denver-Chicago Trucking Co., 132
N.L.R.B. 1416, 48 L.R.R.M. 1524 (1961). Cf. Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763,
50 L.R.R.M. 1495 (1962). For a general review of Board deference, see Coachman's
Inn, 147 N.L.R.B. 278, 306 n.96, 56 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 134, 61
L.R.R.M. 2445 (8th Cir. 1966).
02 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 51 L.R.RM. 1155 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Ramsey v. NLRB, 327
F.2d 784, 55 L.R.R.M. 2441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964).
63 138 N.L.R.B. at 928, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1158. See Edward Axel Roffman Associates,
147 N.L.R.B. 717, 56 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1964); Roadway Express, Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513,
54 L.R.R.M. 1419 (1963) ; Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763, 50 L.R.R.M. 1495
(1962) ; Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Ltd., 123 N.L.R.B. 395, 43 L.R.R.M. 1449, enforcement
denied on other grounds, 274 F.2d 567, 45 L.R.R.M. 2184 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (arbitration
procedures need not meet "Board standards" for recognition).
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The Board deferred to the arbitration award. It not only ac-
knowledged that arbitration had become "an effective and expeditious
means of resolving labor disputes," but conceded to the arbitrator a
superiority of judgment. The Board accepted the award
since it plainly appears . . . that the award is not palpably
wrong. To require more of the Board would mean substi-
tuting the Board's judgment for that of the arbitrator,
thereby defeating the purposes of the Act and the common
goal of national labor policy of encouraging the final adjust-
ment of disputes "as part and parcel of the collective bar-
gaining process.""
This is the point. If the congressional blueprint for labor peace
was to place the employees on an equal economic plane with their
employer, there is no need for Board intervention once a labor agree-
ment, containing machinery for its own administration, is achieved
because of that equality."
CONCLUSION
The Board itself has noted, with some deference, a distinction
between the "application or interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements" and "unfair labor practices." This distinction justifies
insulation of one forum from intrusion by the other. The Board's statu-
tory duty to administer the labor laws as expressed in the Wagner Act
and its amendments is no more consequential because it is cloaked in
64
 138 N.L.R.B. at 928-29, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1158.
65
 See generally Wisconsin S. Gas Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 69 L.R.R.M. 1374
(1968) ; Producers Grain Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 68, 67 L.R.R.M. 1247 (1968) ; Univis,
Inc., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 67 L.R.R.M. 1090 (1968); Fiasco Mfg. Co., 162 N.L.R.B.
No. 56, 64 L.R.R.M. 1077 (1967) ; Anaconda Aluminum Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 35, G2
L.R.R.M. 1370 (1966) ; Auburn Rubber Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 301, 61 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1965),
enforced in part & enforcement denied in part, 384 F.2d 1 , 66 L.R.R.M. 2129 (10th Cir.
1967) ; Flintkote Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 1561, 57 L.R.R.M. 1477 (1964) ; Thor Power Tool
Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1379, 57 L.R.R.M. 1'161 (1964), enforced, 351 F.2d 584, 60 L.R.R.M.
2237 (7th Cir. 1965) ; LeRoy Mach. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431, 56 L.R.R.M. 1369 (1964) ;
Adams Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964).
Where the parties are progressing towards arbitration, but no award has been rend-
ered, the Board will stay its processes pending the award. Dubo Mfg. Corp., 142 N.L.R.B.
431, 53 L,R.R,M. 1070 (1963). The Board subsequently ruled that the award was too
ambiguous to be controlling. 148 N.L.R.B. 1114, 57 L.R.R.M. 1111, enforced, 353 F.2d
157, 60 L.R.R.M. 2373 (6th Cir. 1965). The principle is applicable as well to representa-
tion cases. Raley's Supermarkets, 143 N.L.R.B. 256, 53 L.R.R.M. 1347 (1963). See also
Coachman's Inn, 147 N.L.R.B. 278, 56 L.R.R.M. 1206 (1964), aff'd, 357 F.2d 134, 61
L.R.R.M. 2445 (8th Cir. 1966) (no step taken toward arbitration); Insulation & Spe-
cialties, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1540, 1543, 54 L.R.R.M. 1306, 1307 (1963). Cf. Edward Axel
Roffman Associates, 147 N.L.R.B. 717, 56 L.R.R.M. 1268 (1964).
If nothing has been done by either party to institute arbitration, the Board is less
hospitable. Plumbers Local 469, 149 N.L.R.B. 39, 45, .57 L.R.R.M. 1257, 1258 (1964).
See also Smith Cabinet Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506, 56 L.R.R.M. 1418 (1964); Adams
Dairy Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1410, 56 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964).
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the trappings of law than the duty of an arbitrator acting pursuant
to appointment by private parties. Both are designed to end disputes
affecting interstate commerce; both are quasi-judicial in their search
for facts; and both are approved and encouraged by law. Moreover,
arbitration awards, like cease and desist orders, are enforceable by
the courts. The Board's congressional birthplace does not necessarily
confer upon it a greater stature and dignity, and as a practical solvent
of labor quarrels, arbitration is by far the more efficient.
The Board precedents continue to distinguish among cases (a)
where arbitration has not begun, (b) where it is in progress, and
(c) where the award is rendered for a leisurely scrutiny by the Board.
The general doctrine of Spielberg is good law, as is International
Harvester which requires that an award be honored if not "palpably
wrong." The problem is that it is practically impossible to predict the
Board's course of action. If a thread of consistency does exist, the
Board has kept it remarkably concealed. The language from the per-
tinent cases reveals the qualms and misgivings of an agency obviously
wanting to let routine plant matters be settled by a quicker process
and yet deeply unwilling to let slip some of its power and prestige.
There is more backfilling and sidestepping in this area of Board law
than in any other. Perhaps the courts should put a merciful end to the
Board's agony by considering a favored nations clause which would
allocate the respective labor disputes to that tribunal most peculiarly
fitted to resolve them. This much the courts may do by a resurrection
of the congressional purpose beneath Section 10(a) of the Act.
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